Consequences of Public Programs and Private Transfers on Household’s Investment in Storm Protection by Mahmud, Sakib & Hassan, Gazi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Consequences of Public Programs and
Private Transfers on Household’s
Investment in Storm Protection
Sakib Mahmud and Gazi Hassan
University of Wisconsin-Superior, USA, University of Waikato, New
Zealand
February 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60004/
MPRA Paper No. 60004, posted 18 November 2014 11:07 UTC
Working Paper Draft 
 
1 
 
Consequences of Public Programs and Private 
Transfers on Household’s Investment in Storm 
Protection 
 
Dr Sakib Mahmud 
Department of Business and Economics  
University of Wisconsin – Superior 
Erlanson Hall 301, Belknap and Catlin, P.O. Box 2000 
Superior, WI 54880, USA 
 
 
Dr Gazi Hassan 
Department of Economics 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand 
 
 
Abstract: Due to rising incidences of natural calamities, governments are lacking capacity to 
properly protect households living in areas which are prone to disasters like cyclones and 
associated storm surges. To protect the property damages of the disaster victims, private 
storm protection activities need to be better understood within a systematic framework. We 
develop a theory of household private investment in storm protection, where the storm surge 
risk is endogenous and analyse how the behavioural responses – ex-ante self-protection 
expenditures and ex-post self-insurance expenditures – of the households are affected by both 
government transfers and remittances. The interior solutions of the model show that for a 
risk-averse household, ex-ante government spending on public programs leads to crowding-in 
of self-protection, but crowding-out of self-insurance. Whereas, self-protection declines (i.e., 
becomes a substitute) but self-insurance increases (i.e., becomes a complement) if households 
have more access to ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs. For a 
risk-neutral household, self-protection declines (i.e., becomes a substitute) but self-insurance   
increases (i.e., becomes a complement) if households have more access to private inward 
remittances.  
Key words: Endogenous risk, storm protection behaviour, disaster response, government 
relief, remittances. 
JEL Classification: O12; D03; Q54. 
Working Paper Draft 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Coastal communities are most vulnerable to tsunamis, hurricanes, and other large storms 
(IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). Climate changes may significantly increase the intensity of 
severe cyclones and associated storm surges in future because of sea level rise and increases 
in sea surface temperatures (IPCC, 2007; UNDP, 2007; Dasgupta et al., 2009). Considering 
the climate change induced developments and their possible impacts on the vulnerable coastal 
population especially from low-income countries, governments are recognizing the prospect 
of not having enough funds to support public programs to properly protect their coastal 
communities from major storm events (IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). As a result, coastal 
communities face considerable challenges regarding how to manage their responses to actual 
and anticipated damage from future storm events (World Bank, 2010). Evidence reveals that 
a significant portion of private inward remittances is allocated by coastal households to cope 
with and recover from major natural disaster shocks, such as hurricanes and floods, especially 
in low-and middle-income countries (Yang, 2005; Raschky, 2007; Yang, 2007; Mahapatra et 
al., 2009). Given the coastal households’ access to public sponsored programs and private 
remittances against major storm events, this paper endeavours to develop a theoretical 
framework of private investment behaviour of poor coastal households to insulate themselves 
from the risk of storm damages to their property.   
 
While the risk of the event causing natural disaster is exogenous, evidence suggest that 
individuals do try to influence the likelihood or the severity of an undesirable event (Crocker 
and Shogren, 2003).  Stallen and Thomas (1984) concluded in their seminal paper that 
individuals are not only highly concerned in estimating the uncertainty involved in their 
exposure to a threatening event but also the ways to influence or control their exposure to that 
uncertain event. Considering the higher risks entailed in facing extensive storm-inflicted 
damages to property, households that have had previous encounters with damaging storm 
events might subsequently invest a portion of their time and money to insulate themselves 
against such risks.  Although the households have no control over the exogenous storm event, 
their investments in private storm protection strategies allow them to exercise some control 
over averting expected storm-inflicted damages from occurring and reducing losses to 
property in the event of the damages. Since private investments to implement storm 
protection actions have the potential to reduce the probability and severity of storm-inflicted 
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damages, the risks associated with the event becomes endogenous (Shogren, 1991; Shogren 
and Crocker, 1999; Crocker and Shogren, 1999, 2003; Sandsmark and Vennemo, 2007).  
 
However, human behavioural studies show that one of the main inhibiting factors when it 
comes to investing in natural disaster risk reduction strategies is the lack of concern among 
households about impending natural disasters (Brechin, 2003; Nisbet and Myers, 2007; 
Norgaard, 2009). One possible explanation of this behavioral anomaly is households’ 
treatment of the future natural disaster risk to be low on the probability scale but high on the 
consequence scale (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Magat et al., 1987; Camerer and 
Kunreuther, 1989; Kahneman et al., 2001). Moreover, studies reveal that individuals are less 
likely to insure themselves against natural disaster risks when they believe help will be 
available from outside sources, either via public-sponsored programs or private charities 
(Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). Although there has been no prior 
study investigating households’ private investment behaviour to insure themselves against 
natural disasters when they have migrant family members sending remittances, Clarke and 
Wallsten (2004) found inward remittances to act like insurance and it increases after 
occurrence of a natural disaster event. While studies by Yang and Choi (2007) and Yang 
(2005) reveal that the poorer countries, which are exposed to increased risk of being hit by 
hurricane, are associated with greater remittances flows. These findings vindicate Wisner 
(2003) study that migration flows increase in the aftermath of disasters such as Hurricane 
Gilbert, in Jamaica, and Hurricane Mitch, in Central America. Hence, a household’s incentive 
to increase private storm protection activities to reduce the storm surge damage risk might be 
influenced by whether it has access to public protection programs, private inward remittances, 
or both.  
 
Surprisingly, given the importance of the issues discussed, there has never been a 
comprehensive study on the effect of disaster-related transfers on private economic actions to 
reduce disaster risk. Recently Mahapatra, Joseph and Ratha (forthcoming) have shown that 
remittances do affect ex-post disaster response behaviour using field data from developing 
countries. However, they do not provide a theory or a framework of how this mechanism 
works.  We endeavour to fill in this gap by developing an original model of household private 
investment in storm protection given public transfer and remittances by addressing two 
important issues in this paper. They are (1) whether public protection programs, such as ex-
post public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs and ex-ante publicly constructed 
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barriers, dams, and embankments, lead to less private defensive expenditures by coastal 
households; and, (2) whether expectation of receiving increased flow of remittances to reduce 
losses from a future major storm event also results in less defensive expenditures by coastal 
households.  
 
We explore these issues by developing a household model of private investment in storm 
protection under an endogenous risk framework following Mahmud and Barbier (2011), 
where the representative household chooses the level of its private defensive expenditures to 
protect themselves from damages to property from a major storm event.
1
 We classify a 
household’s private defensive expenditures into two categories: (1) self-protection 
expenditures, a form of ex-ante prevention, are private investments that reduce expected 
storm-inflicted damages from occurring; and, (2) self-insurance expenditures, a form of ex-
post adaptation, are private investments in human, physical, and social capital by the 
households to reduce their losses in the event of storm-inflicted damages. Examples of self-
protection include converting a mud-built house to brick, raising the height of the homestead, 
moving the house inside an embankment, taking refuge in a neighbour’s house, and locating 
further away from the shoreline to a safer place. Examples of self-insurance include income 
source diversification, crop and plot diversification, reciprocal gift exchanges, and inter-and 
intra-household income transfers based on insurance motives (or informal risk sharing). All 
these possibilities are directly or indirectly resulting from household private investments in 
human, physical, and social capital to reduce the severity or magnitude of damages to 
property as a result of a major storm event. .  
 
By applying the endogenous risk framework to the problem of defensive expenditures to 
mitigate storm damages by poor coastal households given their access to public programs and 
private transfers, our paper makes two distinct contributions to the literature. First, for the 
endogenous risk literature (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Shogren and Crocker, 1991; Quiggin, 
1992; Archer et al., 2006), we pioneer the introduction of private transfers through 
remittances from migrant family members that are allocated exclusively to reduce severity of 
property damages from a storm event in a two-choice variables model of private defensive 
strategies of self-protection and self-insurance, for a risk-averse household. Second, for the 
                                               
1 Many previous studies have used the household production function framework to study the impact of adverse 
environmental conditions (e.g., Agee and Crocker, 1996; Berger et al., 1987; Shogren and Crocker, 1991; 
Freeman, 2003). 
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remittances literature (Chami et al., 2008; Page and Plaza, 2006; Rao and Hassan, 2011, 2012; 
Rapport and Docquier, 2005), our paper is the first to introduce an endogenous risk 
framework to understand possible influences of inward remittances on private storm-
protection strategies. In particular, we make use of the comparative analyses from our model 
to predict whether  post-disaster  remittances transfers are substitutes or complements to self-
protection and self-insurance (i.e., whether inward remittances “fully” or “partially” crowd 
out or crowd in private self- protection and self-insurance expenditures). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the household model of 
private investment on storm protection. Section 3 introduces the results from the theoretical 
model. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The Household Model of Private Investment in Storm Protection    
Assume that a representative rural household lives in a coastal area exposed to the threat of a 
severe cyclone-induced storm surge event that could inflict property loss. This storm surge 
risk has two characteristics: (1) the range of possible adverse consequences, and (2) the 
probability distribution across consequences.  In this paper, we measure the adverse effects as 
monetary losses to property in terms of the damages to houses, trees, livestock and poultry, 
and agricultural crops.  To keep the exposition simple, we assume that there is one adverse 
storm event. Since we are interested in the household's defensive actions when it is fully 
exposed to a storm surge event, we do not consider non-storm states. Figure 1 illustrates the 
probability tree that depicts how the sequence of events that takes place when a household is 
fully exposed to a storm surge.   
 
Under a simple discrete formulation, Figure 1 shows that the probability tree starts with the 
adverse storm event, which is exogenous. At this point, the household faces two states of 
nature: state 1, the probability of experiencing property damages,  . ; and state 2, the 
probability of experiencing no damages to property,  1 . . We assume that a household’s 
private spending on storm protection can influence its probability of experiencing property 
damage through self-protection, whereas the severity of any damages resulting from the 
storm surge is reduced through self-insurance.  For the sake of simplicity, the model does not 
consider any health-related impacts, such as injury and loss of life as a result of the storm 
event.   
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The probability of damages to property fully exposed to a storm for representative household 
i located in village j is 
   . ; ,ij ij ij ij ijZ G C        (1) 
where ijZ  is the level of self-protection expenditures including migration that decrease the 
probability of facing ex-post property damages;
2
 ijG  is the household’s access to ex-ante 
public protection programs, such as disaster preparedness programs and publicly constructed 
embankments or dams that reduce the probability that the household incurs flooding 
damages; and, lastly, ijC  is a vector of characteristics of a severe cyclone-induced storm 
surge, such as storm surge height and wind velocity, direction and distance of the cyclone 
path from the household location, etc. 
 
When exposed to a storm, each household faces monetary losses.  We can state this ex-post 
damage to property as 
( ; , )ij ij ij ij ijL L A N R        (2) 
where ijA  is the level of self-insurance expenditures that involve actions to reduce the 
severity of ex-post property damage; 
ijN  is the expectation of receiving increased flow of 
remittances from migrant household members specifically allocated for the reduction 
damages to property from a major storm; and, ijR  is the household’s access to ex-post public 
sponsored disaster relief and rehabilitation programs.  We expect the property losses to 
decrease if the household invests in self-insurance expenditures and enjoys accessibility to 
public-assistance programs and expects to receive more private inward remittances.  
 
 The household is assumed to maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index over 
wealth. Considering the two possible states of nature, let  1(.)
L
ij ijU U W  denote the 
household utility when the household faces storm-inflicted monetary losses to property (state 
1) and 1 ( (.))ij ij ij ijW I A Z L    is the net wealth considering the property loss. In 1W , a 
household’s full income is represented by ijI , its level of self-protection expenditures by ijZ , 
                                               
2 We assume that the self-protection or self-insurance actions of the household have no positive or negative   
externality impact on other households. This suggests that the household cannot transfer the consequences of its 
self-protection or self-insurance actions to others.    
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and its level of self-insurance expenditures by ijA . On the other hand, let 2(.) ( )
NL
ij ijU U W  
denote the household utility when it faces no storm damages (state 2) and 2 ( )ij ij ijW I A Z  
is the net wealth. Since we are dealing with two possible states of nature as a result of full 
exposure to a major storm, we suggest that a household faces more disutility when it 
experiences storm-inflicted damages. This could be interpreted as, (.) (.)
L NL
ij ijU U .  
Furthermore, we assume that the utility functions are strictly increasing, concave, and twice 
continuously differentiable over self-protection  ijZ and self-insurance  ijA expenditures. 
Given these assumptions, the utility functions under the two states of nature are 
   
   
1
2
( ; ,Lij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
NL
ij ij ij ij ij ij
U U W U I Z A L A N R
U U W U I Z A
    
   
   (3) 
Given (1)-( 3), the household maximization problem is
3
 
,
( ; , ) (( ( ; , ))
( )
(1 ( ; , )) (( )
                    
Z A
Z G C U I A Z L A N R
Max E U
Z G C U I A Z


    
                                 
                 
  1 2; , ( ) (1 ( ; , )) ( )  Z G C U W Z G C U W          (4) 
Expression (4) says that expected utility, which is to be maximized, is the sum of the utilities 
of facing damages and no damages, weighted by their respective probabilities.   
 
The first-order conditions with respect to the level of self-insurance and self-protection lead 
to  
 ' '1 2(.) ( ) 1   ( ) (1 (.))
L
U W U W
A
 
 
       
     (5)
 
  ' '1 2 1 2
(.)
( ) ( )   (.) ( ) (1 (.)) ( )U W U W U W U W
Z

 

       

               (6) 
 
where 1
'( )U W and 2
' )(U W are the marginal utilities of income with respect to self-insurance 
and self-protection respectively. Expression (5) reveals that a household could employ self-
insurance to reduce the severity of storm surge damages up to the point where the expected 
marginal benefits of self-insurance, as defined by the net reduction in loss, equal expected 
                                               
3 For ease of exposition, we omit the household index  i and the village index j  in the following steps.    
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marginal costs.  Expression (6) indicates that a household could employ self-protection up to 
the point where the expected marginal benefits of self-protection, as defined by the decreased 
chance of storm damages weighted by the utility difference between the two states, equal 
expected marginal costs.  
 
For the second-order sufficiency conditions associated with (4), the sign of the cross-partial 
derivatives with respect to self-protection and self-insurance expenditures cannot be 
determined even if the household is considered to be averse to storm risks. We show later in 
Appendix A  how imposing additional restrictions in determining the signs of these cross-
partial derivatives plays a significant role in determining the key comparative static results.    
 
3. Comparative Static Analysis of Self-protection and Self-insurance  
A household’s choice of self-protection and self-insurance to reduce extensive storm-inflicted 
damage is influenced by its access to ex-ante and ex-post government protection programs as 
well as private remittances.  We examine these effects through comparative static analysis of 
the interior solution of the model.  The full results are depicted in Appendix A, and they show 
that we cannot determine the directions of the relationships between a household’s private 
defensive strategies and the public programs (both ex-ante and ex-post) unless we impose 
additional conditions on the model. Likewise, the relationship between a household’s private 
defensive strategies and its access to private inward remittances remains ambiguous without 
additional conditions, which are also shown in Appendix A.  
 
The results from the comparative static analysis reveal the following propositions.  
PROPOSITION 1: For a risk-averse household, ex-ante government spending on public 
programs G  leads to crowding-in of self-protection Z , i.e. 0
Z
G



 but crowding-out of self-
insurance A , i.e. 0
A
G



.  That is, public protection programs act as a complement to self-
protection but as a substitute to self-insurance. The proof of Proposition 1 depends on 
Conditions 1 and 2 (derived in Appendix A), which are,   
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Condition 1. 0AZ ZAH H  . That is, assuming self-protection and self-insurance to be 
stochastic substitutes.
4
 This implies that the marginal utility of self-protection, Z , decreases if 
more self-insurance, A , activities are taken by the household and vice-versa.    
Condition 2. 
2
(.)
0
G Z


 
. This suggests that more ex-ante government programs, G , can 
accentuate the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing storm-
inflicted damages to property.  
If either of these conditions is violated, then the signs of 
Z
G


 and 
A
G


 remain ambiguous.    
Supporting evidence for Condition 2 abounds based on the contemporary literature on the 
relationship between public and private investment (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Greene and 
Villanueva, 1991; Erenburg, 1993; Ramirez, 1994, 2000; Oshikoya, 1994; Mitra, 2006). 
Findings by Erenburg (1993) reveal that public infrastructure capital has a stimulating effect 
on private investment in equipment and machinery. Using a panel data on developing 
economies for 1980 to 1997, Erden and Holcombe (2005) showed that a 10% increase in 
public investments lead to a 2% increase in private investments. Blejer and Khan (1984) for a 
panel of developing countries and Oshikoya (1994) for a panel of African countries presented 
evidence that public infrastructure investments has a positive impact on private investment. 
Kollamparambil and Nicolau (2011) study on South Africa found that public investment on 
infrastructure and social sectors is likely to enhance private investment; whereas, Hussain et 
al. (2004) detected positive influence of public development expenditures, such as    
infrastructure, health and education, on private investment based on annual time series data of 
Pakistan between 1975 and 2008. Mistra (2006) and Sterven (2004) also presented evidence 
of crowding-in over the long run and crowding-out over the short run following their research 
on India. 
 
For our research, we consider the positive influence of ex-ante government spending on 
public programs on infrastructures such as roads and embankments on private self-protection 
expenditures. However, we also acknowledge that the direction of the sign for an increase of 
                                               
4  Hiebert (1983) introduced the terms ‘stochastic substitutes’ and ‘stochastic complements’ to define the 
relationships between technological inputs to reduce risks of a competitive firm facing production uncertainty. 
Archer et al. (2006) later applied the same terms to sign their comparative static results under the endogenous 
risk framework to study a parent’s child care choices among alternative childcare technologies when the child 
could be exposed to some environmental hazard.  
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ex-ante government spending on the optimum levels of private self-protection (as well as 
self-insurance) is an empirical question.   
 
PROPOSITION 2: For a risk-averse household, it is not possible to determine the direction 
of the influence of ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs on ex-
ante self-protection and self-insurance. However, for a risk-neutral household and with some 
additional restrictions, self-protection Z  declines (i.e., becomes a substitute) but self-
insurance A  increases (i.e., becomes a complement) if households have more access to ex-
post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs R , i.e. 0 and 0
Z A
R R
 
 
 
. The 
proof of Proposition 3 for a risk-neutral household depends on Conditions 3-5. 
Condition 3.   The probability of facing ex-post storm inflicted property damages, (.) , is 
strictly quasi-convex with respect to self-protection expenditure, Z : 
2
2
(.) (.)
0; 0.
Z Z
  
 
 
 
This implies that the probability of facing monetary losses to property as a result of a cyclone 
induced storm surge decreases as household self-protection expenditure increases.  
 
Condition 4. A strict quasi-convex relationship exists between storm-inflicted monetary 
losses to property and self-insurance expenditures,
2
2
 0; 0
L L
A A
 
 
 
. This means that monetary 
losses to property decrease as a household commits more self-insurance expenditure. 
Condition 5. 
2 (.)
0.
L
R A


 
 Condition 5 states that more ex-post public-assisted disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs, R , accentuate the effect of self-insurance in reducing monetary 
loss or damages to property as a result of a severe storm event.   
 
Conditions 3 and 4 are self-explanatory. However, Condition 5 requires justifications and 
supporting evidence. Condition 5 proposes that access to more ex-post public disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs can further accentuates the effectiveness of self-insurance in 
reducing storm-inflicted monetary loss or damages to property. Based on empirical findings 
on twelve (12) low-and middle-incomes countries that encountered economic crises and 
natural disasters, Skoufias (2003) highlighted some ex-post public strategies that can be more 
effective in protecting households from adverse aggregate shocks. Baez and Mason (2008) 
suggests how ex-post public complimentary policies through education, training, and critical 
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information after a natural disaster event in Latin American countries can empower 
households with  characteristics that enhance their capacity to diversify their income and crop 
portfolios.  Following our theoretical model, these outcomes do assume that the household is 
risk neutral. The behavioral response of risk-averse households is much more difficult to 
discern. Hence, further understanding of the possible direction of the sign requires empirical 
analysis.       
 
PROPOSITION 3: For a risk-averse household, it is not possible to determine the direction 
of the influence of private inward remittances on self-protection and self-insurance. For a 
risk-neutral household, self-protection Z declines (i.e., becomes a substitute) but self-
insurance A  increases (i.e., becomes a complement) if households have more access to 
private inward remittances N  from migrant household members that is specifically allocated 
to reduce severity of the storm event, i.e. 0 and 0
Z A
N N
 
 
 
. Proof of Proposition 3 for a risk-
neutral household depends on Conditions 3, 4, and 6.      
Condition 6. 
2 (.)
0.
L
N A


 
 Condition 6 states that more ex-post private transfers through 
remittances, N , from migrant family members accentuate the effect of self-insurance in 
reducing monetary loss or damages to property from a major storm event.   
If Condition 6 is not met, the crowding in effect based on the sign of 
A
R


, remain  
ambiguous. Moreover, for a risk-averse household, it is not possible to determine the 
direction of the influence of expected increasing flow of private transfers through remittances 
from migrant family members specifically targeted to reduce severity from a major storm 
event. Empirical analysis might help to further understand the possible direction of the sign. 
Some empirical studies do reveal the influence of private remittances on private coping 
strategies against natural disasters, which might be considered as complimentary in nature 
(Yang and Choi; 2007; Mozumder et al., 2009). However, these empirical studies do not 
focus on the effect of disaster-related private transfers in terms of remittances on private 
economic actions to reduce disaster risk.       
 
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results with the accompanying conditions.  We 
observe that factors that are in place before a storm occurs, such as government protection 
programs, are complements to self-protection expenditures by the household, whereas these 
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exogenous influences are substitutes for self-insurance by the household.  The latter effect 
implies that, if the household is receiving protection from government spending programs, 
then it is less likely to have to allocate expenditures for ex-post reduction in losses incurred 
from a storm. Moreover, if the household is already protected by public programs, it can 
enhance its welfare by using complementary self-protection measures to reduce the risk of 
storm damage even further.   
 
Conversely, factors that are in place after a storm occurs, such as the increased availability of 
private transfers through remittances from migrant family members and public disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs reduces self-protection by the household but increases its self-
insurance. If the household expects more post-disaster government programs to be 
implemented and more private transfers, it is less likely to take ex-ante actions to reduce the 
probability of storm damage to its property.  On the other hand, if more ex-post relief and 
rehabilitation and ex-post private transfers through remittances are available, the household 
may allocate more expenditure to self-insure against damages. Considering the disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs are normally driven by community-wide or district-level efforts, 
such public programs might also spur individual households to adopt their own measures to 
safeguard their income and property after the storm. Likewise, for private transfers, 
households might be encouraged to pursue more self-insurance actions after the storm if they 
are confident that they gather sufficient funds to recover their storm-inflicted losses to 
property. However, these outcomes assume that the household is risk neutral. Comparative 
results from our endogenous risk framework model show that the behavioral response of risk-
averse households is much more difficult to establish.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
How does bailing out victims of major storm events, such as cyclones and tsunamis, 
influence the economic behavior of households living in disaster prone areas? Are private 
protective investments of households living in the coastal areas along the flood plains 
reduced in anticipation of public-sponsored programs and private transfers? Our paper 
endeavors to fill in the knowledge gap by proposing a theoretical model of household private 
investment in storm-protection given public programs and private inward remittances.  
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To examine the issues, we classified a household’ investment in storm protection into two 
categories: (1) self-protection expenditures, a form of ex-ante prevention, are private 
investments that reduce expected storm-inflicted damages from occurring; and, (2) self-
insurance expenditures, a form of ex-post adaptation, are private investments in human, 
physical, and social capital by the households to reduce their losses in the event of storm-
inflicted damages. Our household model of private investment in storm protection in terms of 
self-protection and self-insurance are based on an endogenous risk framework where our goal 
is to determine possible influence of government programs and private inward remittances on 
a household’s decision to invest in self-protection and self-insurance. By imposing additional 
restrictions on the model, our results show that ex-ante public programs, such as publicly 
constructed protective barriers, embankments, or dams that can reduce the probability of 
flooding as a result of the storm, are complements to self-protection investments by a risk-
averse household. However, these same factors are substitutes to household self-insurance 
expenditures. But possible directions of the influence of ex-post public disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs and private inward remittances on private storm protection behaviour 
cannot be determined for risk-averse household. By assuming the household to be risk-
neutral and introducing further restrictions, we are able to show that ex-post public programs 
and private inward remittances reduce self-protection by the household but increase its self-
insurance.  
 
We identified there is evidence abound on some of the important conditions applied in our 
theoretical model. But we also acknowledge that the direction of the sign of relationships 
between public programs and private storm protection behavior is an empirical question to 
provide credence to our theoretical underpinnings. Same also applies in determining the sign 
of the relationships between private inward remittances received from a migrant family 
member and its possible influence on private storm protection behavior. It will be interesting 
to see whether access to either public programs or private inward remittances is enough to 
deter or encourage private investments to reduce risks from storm-inflicted damages to 
property by averting the likelihood as well as reducing the severity or magnitude of such risk 
event.  
 
We think that theory of household private investment in storm protection that we have 
developed could be generalized to all coastal communities which are affected by climate 
change. Hypotheses based on the research questions and the Propositions derived from the 
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theoretical model could be tested empirically. Findings from such studies could recommend 
the steps that the governments might take to develop an institutional setup under joint public-
private partnerships by encouraging more collective and individual participation in storm-
protection activities among the vulnerable communities from major storm events. We believe 
by identifying and nurturing such form of institutions, governments representing the low-and 
middle-income countries would be able to mitigate the impacts of market failures due to 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise from public-sponsored programs. In 
addition, we consider that identifying the channels through which private inward remittances 
directly and indirectly influence private storm protection behavior or attitudes towards 
reducing the likelihood as well as severity from storm-inflicted damages to property has some 
serious policy implications in the future. Lastly, outcomes from our research will be 
particularly relevant for developing countries, especially from south-east Asia and small 
island states of the Pacific, intention to promote and support sustainable development projects 
by improving their resilience and response capacity to cope against natural disaster events as 
a result of global climate change.               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Draft 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Probability Tree of a Sequence of Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adverse cyclone induced 
storm surge event 
(Environmental risk) 
Stage 1 
(Facing property damages under storm 
event) 
 
Stage 1 
(Facing no property damages under 
storm event) 
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Table 1: Comparative Static Results of the Household Model of Defensive Strategies 
Household Self-protection ( )Z  
 Conditional  Result Requirements for 
Signing  Conditional 
Result 
Access to ex- ante public 
protection spending 0
dZ
dG
  
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
G Z

 


 
 
Expectation of receiving 
increased flow of remittances 
from migrant family members  
                       0
(Hold only for risk neutral households)
dZ
dN

 
2 ( , )
0
L A R
N A


 
 
Access to ex-post relief and 
rehabilitation programs  
(Holds only for risk neutral households)
                      0
dZ
dR

 
2 ( , )
0
L A R
R A


 
 
Household Self-insurance ( )A  
Access to ex- ante public 
protection spending 0
dA
dG
   
Expectation of receiving 
increased flow of remittances 
from migrant family members 
                          0
(Holds only for risk neutral households)
dA
dN
  
2 ( , )
0
L A R
N A


 
 
Access to ex-post relief and 
rehabilitation programs                            0
(Holds only for risk neutral households)
dA
dR
  
2 ( , )
0
L A R
R A


 
 
 
 
 
  
2
1.  0
(.)
2. 0
AZ ZAH H
G Z

 


 
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Appendix A 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1. Comparative analyses results show that we cannot determine the 
direction of the relationship between a household’s averting behavior and ex-ante public 
protection spending unless we impose additional restrictions.  
 
Using the first order conditions (5) and (6) of the main paper and the implicit function 
theorem, the comparative static effects of a decrease in G on the optimal levels of self-
protection Z   yields,  
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +Z A
AA AZ
Z
ZA ZA
A
AA AA
EMB EMB
H H
Z G G
G H
F EMB
H H
G G
EMBF
H H
G G
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
        (A.1) 
 
where, 
1
Z
F EMB is the first order condition with respect to self-protection, i.e. the expected 
marginal benefits of self-protection based on expression (5); 2
AF EMB  is the first order 
condition with respect to self-insurance, i.e. the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance 
based on expression (6); AAH  is the own-partial of self-insurance; and ZAH  is the cross-partial 
of self-protection and self-insurance. Both partials are based on the Hessian matrix 
ZZ ZA
AZ AA
H H
H
H H
 .  
  
In expression (A.1), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect 
of the ex-ante public spending on self-insurance while the second term is the indirect effect.  
 
Likewise, the comparative static effects of a decrease in G  on the optimal level of self-
insurance A  yields,  
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +A Z
ZZ AZ
Z
ZZ ZZ
A
AZ AZ
EMB EMB
H H
A G G
G H
F EMB
H H
G G
EMBF
H H
G G
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
        (A.2)  
 
where, 
1
ZF EMB is the first order condition with respect to self-protection, i.e. the 
expected marginal benefits of self-protection based on expression (5); 2
AF EMB  is the first 
order condition with respect to self-insurance, i.e. the expected marginal benefits of self-
insurance based on expression (6); AAH  is the own-partial of self-insurance; and ZAH  is the 
cross-partial of self-protection and self-insurance. Both partials are based on the Hessian 
matrix ZZ ZA
AZ AA
H H
H
H H
 .  
 
In expression (A.2), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect 
of the ex-ante public spending on self-protection while the second term is the indirect effect. 
 
Working Paper Draft 
 
18 
 
Expression (A.1) and (A.2) show that the sign and magnitude of the direct effect depends on 
how a change in ex-ante public spending affects the expected marginal benefits of self-
protection Z
EMB
G


 
 
 
 and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance A
EMB
G


 
 
 
.  In 
addition, it depends on the signs of 
ZZ
H and 
AA
H  which are both negative by the second-order 
conditions.  Like the direct effect, the indirect depends on the influence of ex-ante public 
spending on the expected marginal benefits of self-protection and self-insurance.  However, it 
also depends on the signs of the cross partials of self-protection and self-insurance 
( )
AZ ZA
H H which cannot be determined. 
 
Substituting the influence of ex-ante public programs, G , on the expected marginal benefits 
of self-protection, ZEMB
G


, and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB
G


, in 
expression (A.1) leads to  
 
         
 
 
' ''?' ' '
' '' '
2
'
1' ' '?'1 2
' ' ' '' ' ' '
' ' '
1 2 2
(.)(.)
( ) 1( ) ( )
(.)
( ) ( ) ( )
AA ZA
L
U WU W U W
G AG ZH H
Q
U W U W U W
Z G G
G H





  
  
     
                  
  
   
          

       (A.3) 
 
 
Similarly, Substituting the influence of ex-ante public programs, G , on the expected marginal 
benefits of self-protection, ZEMB
G


, and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, 
AEMB
G


, in expression (A.2) yields 
          
 
 
' '' ' '?'
' '
' '
2
'
1' ' '?' 1 2
' ' ' '' '' '
' ''
1 22
(.) (.)( ) 1 ( ) ( )
(.) ( ) ( )( )
ZZ AZ
L
U W U W U W
G A G ZH H
U W U WU W
GA G
G H
 





 
   
                     
   
            

  (A.4) 
 
It is not possible to sign expression (A.3) and (A.4) unambiguously.  They can only be signed 
if the following conditions hold, 
 
Condition 1. 0AZ ZAH H  . That is, assuming self-protection and self-insurance to be 
stochastic substitutes.
5
 This implies that the marginal utility of self-protection, Z , decreases if 
more self-insurance, A , activities are taken by the household and vice-versa.   
                                               
5  Hiebert (1983) introduced the terms ‘stochastic substitutes’ and ‘stochastic complements’ to define the 
relationships between technological inputs to reduce risks of a competitive firm facing production uncertainty. 
Archer et al. (2006) later applied the same terms to sign their comparative static results under the endogenous 
risk framework to study a parent’s child care choices among alternative childcare technologies when the child 
could be exposed to some environmental hazard.  
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Condition 2. 
2
(.)
0
G Z


 
. This suggests that more ex-ante government protection activities 
G can accentuate the influence of self-protection, Z , in reducing the probability of facing 
storm-inflicted damages to property.  
    
Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are met, it is possible to sign - expressions (A.1) and (A.2) 
accordingly. 
  
" " " "" " " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0AA ZA
H HZ
G H H
  
    
  

 
  
" " " "" " " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0zz AZ
H HA
G H H
  
    
  

  (A.5) 
 
Therefore, under additional restrictions, comparative statics result show that ex-ante 
government protection spending, G , is a complement to self-protection, Z , but is a substitute 
to self- insurance, A .  
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 2. Starting with the risk-averse case, comparative results on the 
influence of ex-post government risk-reducing programs like disaster relief and rehabilitation 
activities on household private defensive strategies show that the direction of the relationship 
can be determined only under certain restrictions. Comparative static results show   
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +Z A
AA AZ
Z
ZA ZA
A
AA AA
EMB EMB
H H
Z R R
R H
F EMB
H H
R R
EMBF
H H
R R
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
           (A.6) 
  
direct effect indirect effect 
*
1
2
 +A Z
ZZ AZ
Z
ZZ ZZ
A
AZ AZ
EMB EMB
H H
A R R
R H
F EMB
H H
R R
EMBF
H H
R R
H H
 
  
  


 
 
 
    
     
         (A.7) 
 
Expressions (A.6)-(A.7) reveal that the sign and magnitude of the direct effects depend on the 
own partials,  and ZZ AAH H , as well as how a change in the ex-post public-assisted disaster 
relief and rehabilitation programs influences expected marginal benefits of self-protection,  
ZEMB
R


, and self-insurance, A
EMB
R


. Conversely, the indirect effects depend on the cross 
partials, 
 and ZA AZH H , and the influence of ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and 
rehabilitation programs on the expected marginal benefit of self-protection and self-
insurance.  
 
Under the risk-averse assumption, results reveal that the direction of the relationship between 
ex-post public programs and the private averting strategies remain ambiguous because it is 
not possible to determine the direction of influence of ex-post public programs, R , on the 
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expected marginal benefits of self-protection 
Z
ij
EU
EMB
Z



 
 
 
.  However, if the households are 
assumed to be risk neutral, then it is possible to establish the direction of the relationships by 
imposing the additional restriction.  
 
Substituting the influence of ex-post public programs, R , on the expected marginal benefits 
of self-protection, 
ZEMB , and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB , in 
expressions (A.6) and (A.7) lead to,  
"?"
' '' ' 2
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '' ' 1' ' '?'
' "
1 1 ' '
" "" "
' '
"
1
(.)
(.) ( )
(.) (.)
( ) ( )
(.)
(.) 1 ( )
AA ZA
L
U W
L L R A
H U W U W H
Z R R
L L
U W
A RZ
R H





  
 




 
 
     
                   
       
      
    

            (A.8) 
Under the first term of the numerator, the bracketed portion representing 
1
Z
EMB F
R R
 

 
 cannot 
be signed. Therefore, the sign of 
Z
R


 remains ambiguous.   
 
On self-insurance, A ,  
"?"
' '' ' 2
' ' ' ''
' '' '
1 ' '' ' '?' ' '
' "
1 1' ' " "
" "' '
"
1
(.)
(.) ( )
(.) (.)
( ) (.) ( )
(.) (.)
(.) 1 ( )
ZZ AZ
L
U W
L LR A
H H U W U W
Z R R
L L
U W
A RA
R H





 

 
 

 
 
   
                  
      
     
    

           (A.9) 
It is not possible to sign expression (A.9) unambiguously because we cannot determine the 
directions of the influence of ex-post public assisted relief and rehabilitation program on the 
expected marginal benefit of self-protection 
1
Z
EMB F
R R
 

 
 
 
 
under the indirect effect.  
Moreover, additional restrictions need to be imposed  to sign the term 
2
L
R A

 
and the cross 
partial ZAH .   
 
Assuming household to be risk neutral, comparative static results show 
'?'' ' ' ' ' '
2 2
2
L L L L
A Z R Z A R AZ
R H
 
 
  
         
            
            

    (A.10) 
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'?'' ' ' ' ' '
2 2
2
(.)
L L L
L
A Z R A Z A R Z
R H
  

  
        
                    

    (A.11) 
Under the risk neutral case, it is possible to sign both (A.10) and (A.11) if the following 
condition holds:  
 
Condition 3.   The probability of facing ex-post storm inflicted property damages, (.) , is 
strictly quasi-convex with respect to self-protection expenditure, Z : 
2
2
(.) (.)
0; 0.
Z Z
  
 
 
 
This implies that the probability of facing monetary losses to property as a result of a cyclone 
induced storm surge decreases as household self-protection expenditure increases.  
 
Condition 4. A strict quasi-convex relationship exists between storm-inflicted monetary 
losses to property and self-insurance expenditures,
2
2
 0; 0
L L
A A
 
 
 
. This means that monetary 
losses to property decrease as a household commits more self-insurance expenditure. 
Condition 5. 
2 (.)
0.
L
R A


 
 Condition 5 states that more ex-post public-assisted disaster relief 
and rehabilitation programs, R , accentuate the effect of self-insurance in reducing monetary 
loss or damages to property as a result of a severe storm event.  If Conditions (5) along with 
the other conditions hold, then it is possible to sign expression (A.10) and (A.11) indicating 
the following relationship 
 
" " " "' ' " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0
" "
AA ZAH HZ
R H
  
    
  
 
 
" " " "' ' " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
0
" "
ZZ AZH HA
R H
  
    
  
 
  (A.12) 
 
Expression (A.12) shows that self-protection, Z , is expected to go down but self-insurance, A
, is expected to go up if households have more access to ex-post government-assisted disaster 
relief and rehabilitation programs, R . Consequently, one might observe a ‘crowding out 
effect’ on households’ self-protection but a ‘crowding in effect’ of self-insurance as a result 
of an increase in R , assuming the household to be risk neutral.  However, it is not possible to 
come to a conclusion if the household is risk averse.    
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 3 Comparative static results reveal that we require additional 
restrictions to establish any relationship between the increase in private inward remittances to 
the household from its migrant family member(s) and the household’s private defensive 
strategies in terms of self-protection and self-insurance.    
 
Substituting the influence of private remittances, N , on the expected marginal benefits of 
self-protection, 
ZEMB , and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance, AEMB , in 
expressions (A.6) and (A.7) lead to,  
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"?"
' '' ' 2
' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' '' ' 1' ' '?'
' "
1 1 ' '
" "" "
' '
"
1
(.)
(.) ( )
(.) (.)
( ) ( )
(.)
(.) 1 ( )
AA ZA
L
U W
L L N A
H U W U W H
Z N N
L L
U W
A NZ
N H





  
 




 
 
     
                   
       
      
    

               (A.13) 
Under the first term of the numerator, the bracketed portion representing 
1
Z
EMB F
N N
 

 
 cannot 
be signed. Therefore, the sign of 
Z
N


 remains ambiguous.   
 
On self-insurance, A ,  
"?"
' '' ' 2
' ' ' ''
' '' '
1 ' '' ' '?' ' '
' "
1 1' ' " "
" "' '
"
1
(.)
(.) ( )
(.) (.)
( ) (.) ( )
(.) (.)
(.) 1 ( )
ZZ AZ
L
U W
L LN A
H H U W U W
Z N N
L L
U W
A NA
N H





 

 
 

 
 
   
                  
      
     
    

        (A.14) 
 
It is not possible to sign expression (A.13) unambiguously because we cannot determine the 
directions of the influence of private inward remittances on the expected marginal benefit of 
self-protection 
1
Z
EMB F
N N
 

 
 
 
 
under the indirect effect.  Moreover, additional restrictions 
need to be imposed  to sign the term 
2
L
N A

 
and the cross partial ZAH .   
 
Assuming household to be risk neutral, comparative static results show 
'?'' ' ' ' ' '
2 2
2
L L L L
A Z N Z A N AZ
N H
 
 
  
         
             
            

            (A.15) 
'?'' ' ' ' ' '
2 2
2
(.)
L L L
L
A Z N A Z A N Z
N H
  

  
        
                    
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          (A.16) 
Under the risk neutral case, it is possible to sign both (A.15) and (A.16) if the following 
condition holds:  
 
Condition 6. 
2 (.)
0.
L
N A


 
 Condition 6 states that more ex-post private transfers through 
remittances, N , from migrant family members accentuate the effect of self-insurance in 
reducing monetary loss or damages to property from a major storm event.  If Condition (6) 
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along with the other conditions hold, then it is possible to sign expression (A.15) and (A.16) 
indicating the following relationship 
 
" " " "' ' " "
2nd bracketed term 4th bracketed term " " + " "
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  
 
  (A.17) 
 
Expression (A.17) shows that self-protection, Z , is expected to go down but self-insurance, A
, is expected to go up if households expect to receive more private remittances, N , from 
migrant family members. Assuming a household to be risk-neutral, we might observe a 
‘crowding out effect’ on households’ self-protection but a ‘crowding in effect’ of self-
insurance for an increase in N .  It is not possible to come to a conclusion if the household is 
risk averse.    
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